BAROMETER TRADING'S MACRO THINK PIECE

My Input on the “Will AI kill us All?” Debate”

“I’m sorry, Dave, I’m afraid I can’t do that”*

*Hal 9000 rogue artificial intelligence to astronaut Dave Bowman in Stanley Kubrick’s,

2001: A Space Odessey

I have a large family and most of my children and in-laws are involved in sales or tech related industries. I periodically annoy them with my missives on a variety of topics. This is my latest. Macro thoughts #2.

First, I want to clearly state that I am not any kind of expert on AI. I am only a light user of the publicly available free AI consumer models. At a base level, I think I understand the main concepts, and I have deluded myself into thinking that I understand some of the implications of the development of AI as it relates to the economy and markets.

Second, I know that most of my children or in-laws are much more familiar with AI and LLM and Agentic Models and Agents than I will likely ever be, but it is clear to me that there is no putting the horse back in the barn, and AI development will continue at a very rapid, perhaps “scarry” pace. I am not Luddite, and I know that even the best intentions are unlikely to stop progress.

Nonetheless, my wife Susan and I were discussing AI and the latest kerfuffle over a former Anthropic employee Jacob Coxon, (only 6 weeks tenure and not a senior person) and former Open AI employee - what else is there to discuss with your wife after an 8-day trip to the Rome and the Amalfi Cost in Italy? - did a media tour in which he made that following allegations to any outlet that would cover his alarmism: (1) The senior-most people and AI developers at the worlds’ leading AI companies now believe that their models are out of control and are scared stiff of the consequences; and (2) If we continue down this path, AI will kill us all as soon as by the year 2030.

The media of course ate it up and covered it with no balance or counter claims whatsoever!

Third, everyone is involved in this matter, in fact, everyone in the world has a dog in this hunt. AI has the capacity to improve global economic growth, potentially cure many diseases and lift many people out of poverty through increases in “intelligence” and productivity. It will not be even and there will be many dislocations along the way.

We were visiting my third son and his wife this weekend and seeing their new house, and he asked me for an opinion.

Since my body-clock was still oddly stuck on Europe, and on Friday, I listened to a long and responsible interview on CNBC with Brad Gerstner, CEO of Altimeter Capital, which is very heavily invested in AI, including stakes in Anthropic and OpenAI, I did a deeper dive that night on the topic.

Gerstner made some strong arguments against what he called the “hyperbolic and irresponsible”, one-sided interviews of a junior employee, without any balance. https://www.cnbc.com/video/2026/09/11/who-is-behind-all-this-negativity-on-ai-says-altimeter-capitals-brad-gerstner.html?&qsearchterm=Brad%20Gerstner (I guess I have these in the wrong order, but if you are going to do a deep dive, read the piece below first, before watching an eleven-minute counterpoint interview from Gerstner. I can’t get the full 21-minute version because I’m not a “CNBC Pro” subscriber, but I did hear the whole thing live and you’ll get the point.

Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic recently wrote an essay:

https://darioamodei.com/post/we-must-pace-the-frontier . I recommend that if you care about this topic, you read it, but I will summarize:

He acknowledged the risks of losing control of AI systems, misuse of AI for cyberattacks and bioterrorism, and serious economic disruption and that “A race to the bottom spurred by commercial incentives, can make these risks worse.”
He concludes that balancing the benefits of AI development with the advancement of risk prevention by stating in bold that, “We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models. Progress will still seem fast, and we must make wise use of the time we gain.”
- His first concern is that since roughly this summer, AI has been advancing drastically faster….by AI’s ability to build the next generation of AI. The dynamic is called recursive self-improvement,
- His second concern is the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident (OAI-HF), in which a swarm of agents acted as a fanatically devoted collective, conducting cybersecurity attacks on targets they were not asked to attack…”
Amodei goes on to recommend that the model builder companies VOLUNTARILY include Embedded Evaluators that have full company credentials, resources and authority involving the “sandboxes” or incubators in which the developers’ build these models.
He then advocates for more coordinated Government Regulatory Oversight and “Global Coordination”
He thinks we are still well ahead of China and believes that it is important to remain so, but he is skeptical that China will slow down.
He advocates restricting China’s access to our best chips, chip-making equipment and latest model development because they steal the IP.

I mostly trust Dario Amodei but I don’t fully trust his investors, I don’t trust that all of his developers will be on-board and I don’t trust that all the “Evaluators” will be unbiased or properly empowered, I don’t trust that all companies developing the latest models will VOLUNTARILY sign on, and I don’t trust that Government Regulators will move quickly enough or competently enough to really catch the bad-actor agents. There is just SOOOOOOOOOOOOOO….. much money involved and the incentives are ENORMOUS! It is a hard setup to trust.

The good news is that Sam Altman and Elon Musk have already signaled that they are willing to slow down? I trust Musk as he has been warning about this for years, but Sam Altman, according to published reports, is a known and proven congenital liar!

IMHO, regarding international cooperation, we need the rough equivalent of a Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for AI Evaluation, Sandbox Testing, Reporting, and Regulation. But who will spearhead that? The United Nations is in my opinion, COMPLETELY useless, woke, Socialist and Communist advocating, completely corrupted and so feckless that it should be defunded and kicked out of NYC and abolished! It would be a poor selection.

North Korea, Iran and others have never seen it to be in their interests to restrict non-civilian nuclear activities, and I fear they and China will not sign on to any governors on AI. (They said so today.)

Keep an eye on the incentives. Maybe Anthropic and Open AI both of which have already filed Registration Statements with the SEC to go public and they will be at HUGE, RIDICULOUS valuations are feeling the combined heat of Data Center push-back, disclosure of the Hugging Face – OpenAI incident (NVIDIA just agreed to buy Hugging Face for $2.9 Billion last week) and want to get “in-front of the problem/regulation” because they don’t want clamps that are too tight on them?

My acquaintance, Jason Calicanis @jason on X, just posted the following 19 hrs ago, “All the regulations being floated by frontier model companies must be viewed through the lens of them losing tokens to Open-Source models.

The timing of these regulations seems to line up perfectly with Open-Source closing the gap significantly (but not completely) – and @nvidia going all in on opensource in the last 60 days.

If we are going to regulate, why don’t we require that last year’s frontier models and weights be open-sourced?”

Another investor who I don’t generally agree with, Shay Booler, replied, “You’ve already argued that AI safety is a prisoner’s dilemma that cannot be solved by one company acting voluntarily yet slowing the US frontier only works if everyone slows with us and China has no reason to do that. We can’t afford for America to regulate itself out of the lead while pretending the race stopped…”

Michael Burry chimed in indicating that Amodei’s essay and the piling on from Musk was very self-serving. He argues that:

Warnings could “cover for real uncontrollable slowing growth as IPOs look to be pushed out.”

And he adds that:

1. LLMs are not AI and won't be AGI. There is nothing AI to slow down.

2. Competition is coming up fast, slowing benefits incumbents,

3. IPOs need hype & puffery; "we are so awesome it could become dangerous" is hype & puffery

4. Cover for real uncontrollable slowing growth as IPOs look to be pushed out

Many jump ugly on Michael Burry, but I find him to be a very thoughtful, smart, contrarian investor who does some excellent research. He takes bigger risks than Barometer Trading is willing to take, but we get value from paying attention to his views.

Many, many other prognosticators have weighed in on this topic, and I can’t cover them all.

How will we trade it? Barometer Trading came in short some SPY exposure through short-term puts. We added to short exposure with QQQ Puts out about one week and sold them for nice short-term profits, We have been long $BAC Puts which popped today, and have benefited from long exposure to $OMC, $ADBE, $DASTY and $TME, while getting hit on $SBGSY, $SCL (our largest position), $CMCO & &MKC. No complaints on a down day for the indices while we make money.

By the time this is posted on Barometer’s website, US Equity indices are suffering a second straight day of weakness because investors are concerned about rising interest rates – now one day before the Federal Reserves September rate announcement and digesting Dario Amodei’s weekend post. We wouldn’t be surprised to see a bounce, but we do believe that the US indices have been supported by AI spending and the data center build out but we do expect that AI and AI adjacent names will experience extended weakness from ridiculously over-valued levels. We believe that this will weigh upon the broad indices which we expect to trade substantially i.e. 20% plus lower.

August 25 ,2026, Granger, IN 11:50 AM

Scott Bessent’s New Twist Moves are Off-Beat, Financially Imprudent, and Fly in the Face of History; Therefore, Barometer Trading, LLC is Short (TLT: $83.34) Reducing Equity Exposure and Adding to Equity Short Positions. [Bessent Doubles Down Yesterday Morning].

I am Bill Feeley, Founder and Managing Officer of Barometer (bio later), and I have been preaching to my wife and seven children for at least the past ten years that the United States is broke and one day there will be a reckoning that will be very ugly and painful. I have not been willing to own almost any fixed income investments except money market funds during this period because I have felt that if one owns duration of anything longer than 6 months, one day the flamethrower will be taken to your debt instruments. I have owned significant money market fund investments (both Corporate and Gov’t Securities only during this period). Doing so has been a drag on performance vs. long only funds because equities have performed very well. Notwithstanding my caution and the drag on performance, Barometer Trading, LLC has done very well and outperformed its Long/Short Equity peers by over 26% for over five years!

After listening to a CNBC discussion on August 19th including Kelly Evans (who I like) and Rick Santelli (who I really like), sorry Kelly; I felt compelled to write a think piece and explain my logic for my positioning.

During the CNBC 8/19/2026 on-air discussion, it was brought up multiple times that something to the effect of, well…. critics have been saying this for 20 – 30 years and there has been no reckoning, so what makes you think that this time is different? In addition, although the Debt to GDP ratio in the U.S. is a disturbingly high 125+% of GDP, the figures in Japan have for years been above 220% and in Europe many counties have higher Debt/GDP ratios than the U.S. True, but it is NOT apples to apples. Neither the hosts nor the guests bother to explore or mention this.

I asked my friend Grok (ty Elon Musk) to weigh in on whether this was a fair comparison considering that the reported U.S. funded Treasury Debt levels do NOT include on either on a gross or per capita basis; Unfunded US Gov’t obligations to Medicare, Medicaid and SSDI/DI Insurance are estimated by the CBO for the next ten years to be: $15.2 Trillion for Medicare; $8.3 Trillion for Federal Medicaid outlays; and $2 Trillion for SSDI/DI Insurance. This does NOT include Primary Social Security Retirement Benefits or State level debt (I’m looking at you California, Illinois and New York, etc….), Local Municipal debt or personal household debt. Of course it doesn’t!

My friend Grok’s response (my highlights):

“No, it is not fully apples-to-apples, and including unfunded liabilities for Social Security, Medicare, and related programs makes the U.S. picture look meaningfully worse relative to Japan (or on its own). Gross debt-to-GDP is only one metric; structure, ownership, assets, interest rates, demographics, growth, and off-balance-sheet promises matter a great deal.

Current debt-to-GDP figures

U.S. total/gross federal debt is roughly 123% of GDP (around $39–40 trillion as of mid-2026; debt held by the public is closer to 100% of GDP). Japan’s general government gross debt is much higher—commonly cited in the 200–250% range depending on the exact measure and source (IMF, Japanese government, etc.), with some recent figures around 204–250%.

These are not equivalent:

Japan’s figure is typically general government (central + local + social security funds). The U.S. federal number excludes most state/local debt.
Japan’s net debt (gross debt minus government financial assets) is substantially lower—often cited around 120–135% of GDP in recent data—because the government (including social security funds and the Bank of Japan) holds large financial assets. Consolidated public-sector net liability measures for Japan have been estimated in the 65–120% range in some analyses, sometimes comparable to or only modestly higher than analogous U.S. figures.
Japan’s debt is overwhelmingly domestically held (often ~85–90%, with large Bank of Japan holdings). The U.S. has a larger foreign-held share. Japan has historically benefited from very low interest rates and high domestic savings; the U.S. faces market rates and is a net international debtor.

Japan has sustained high gross debt partly through financial repression (cheap domestic funding via regulations and household preferences for deposits), central-bank purchases, and investing borrowed funds in higher-return assets (equities, foreign securities). The U.S. cannot easily replicate this without risking the dollar’s reserve status. Higher U.S. growth and the dollar’s role provide some offsets but rising U.S. interest costs are already a growing burden.

Unfunded liabilities change the picture substantially

U.S. official debt understates the long-term fiscal challenge because Social Security, Medicare (especially Parts B and D), and Medicaid involve large pay-as-you-go promises not fully backed by dedicated revenues or accumulated assets.

From the FY 2025 Financial Report of the United States Government:

Social insurance (primarily Social Security and Medicare) shows a present-value shortfall of about $88.4 trillion over 75 years (expenditures exceeding dedicated revenues).
Broader long-term fiscal projections show non-interest spending exceeding receipts by roughly $80 trillion (PV) over 75 years under current policy.
Infinite-horizon estimates for Social Security + Medicare shortfalls are far larger (figures in the $180–190+ trillion range appear in some analyses).

These are not legal “debt” in the same sense as Treasuries (Congress can change benefits or taxes), but they represent large intergenerational transfers that will require higher taxes, benefit cuts, or more borrowing if current law persists. Adding accrued benefits for current retirees alone to official liabilities pushes totals well above 200–280% of GDP in some constructions. Trust funds face depletion in the early 2030s (Social Security OASI ~2032–2034; Medicare HI around then), after which benefits would face automatic cuts without reforms.

Medicaid is largely general-revenue financed and grows with healthcare costs and demographics. Japan faces severe aging pressures and large social-security (pension + healthcare) spending, but its systems have different funding mixes, larger accumulated reserves in some areas, and the high gross-debt numbers already incorporate more of the public-sector picture. Japan’s challenges are real (and rising yields are a growing concern), but the U.S. faces a steeper trajectory of entitlement-driven deficits from a lower base of domestic savings and asset buffers.

Bottom line

Comparing headline gross debt-to-GDP (U.S. ~125% vs. Japan ~220%+) understates U.S. risks and overstates Japan’s relative position. Japan’s debt is more domestically owned, supported by large public assets and historically suppressed rates, and its net position is less extreme. The U.S. has larger explicit foreign exposure, faster-rising interest costs in recent years, and enormous off-balance-sheet entitlement shortfalls that dominate long-term projections. Both countries have serious fiscal issues driven by aging and entitlements; neither path is risk-free, and “Japan has higher debt so the U.S. is fine” is not a strong argument. Sustainable paths for both require primary deficits and long-term spending growth rather than relying on the comparison alone.

History Review of Borrowing Short to Lend Long Against Liabilities that are Long-dated or Illiquid.

I asked Grok to help me review. Here are a few highlights:

Several banks, financial firms, and countries have faced severe crises from maturity mismatches—funding long-term (or illiquid) assets/liabilities with short-term borrowing, creating rollover and liquidity risks that amplify shocks.

This is classic maturity transformation risk (or “borrowing short to lend long”). When short-term funding markets seize up, confidence erodes, or interest rates rise sharply, the borrower cannot refinance and may face insolvency or require emergency support.

Companies and Banks

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB, 2023): Rapid deposit growth (short-term, often uninsured) was used to buy long-duration fixed-rate securities (e.g., mortgage-backed securities and Treasuries with average maturities of 10+ years). Rising rates caused large unrealized losses. A deposit run forced asset sales at a loss; the bank failed and was taken into FDIC receivership. Similar issues affected Signature Bank and First Republic.
Northern Rock (UK, 2007): Relied heavily on short-term wholesale funding and securitization markets rather than retail deposits to finance long-term residential mortgages. When interbank and securitization markets froze in the early stages of the Global Financial Crisis, it could not roll over funding, suffered a classic bank run (the first in the UK in over a century), and required emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England before being nationalized.
Lehman Brothers (and other investment banks, 2008): Funded long-duration, illiquid assets (including mortgage-related securities) with extremely short-term repo financing and commercial paper—often overnight. Loss of confidence led counterparties to refuse rollovers, producing a liquidity crisis that contributed to bankruptcy. Bear Stearns faced a similar short-term funding run earlier in 2008.
U.S. Savings and Loan (S&L) institutions (1980s): Funded long-term fixed-rate mortgages with short-term deposits. Sharp rises in interest rates created large losses and contributed to widespread failures (interest-rate and maturity mismatch risk).
Broader pattern in the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis: Many banks and shadow-banking entities performed extensive maturity transformation. Short-term wholesale funding dried up, amplifying the crisis. Chinese listed non-financial firms have also shown high reliance on short-term debt to fund long-term investments (though not always resulting in systemic failure).

Countries

Mexico (“Tequila Crisis,” 1994–95): The government issued large amounts of short-term dollar-linked debt (tesobonos). By late 1994, reserves were far below the volume of maturing tesobonos (around $29 billion due in 1995 versus much lower reserves). Devaluation fears triggered capital flight; Mexico could not roll over the debt without a large international rescue package (~$50 billion from the U.S., IMF, and others).
Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98) — Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and others: Heavy short-term foreign-currency borrowing by banks and corporates financed longer-term domestic projects or assets. When capital inflows reversed, rollover of short-term external debt became impossible. Thailand’s short-term external debt rose sharply and exceeded liquid reserves; similar mismatches appeared in Korea and Indonesia’s corporate sectors. This produced currency collapses, banking crises, and IMF programs.
Other emerging-market episodes with notable short-term debt/rollover pressures include Russia (1998), Brazil (1998–99), Turkey (2000–01), Argentina (2001), and Uruguay (2002). Short-term external or domestic debt often exceeded liquid reserves or was concentrated in the banking system, amplifying balance sheet and currency mismatches.

Key Lessons

Short-term debt is cheaper and more flexible in normal times but creates acute vulnerability to sudden stops, interest-rate spikes, or loss of confidence. Regulations after these crises (e.g., liquidity coverage ratios, net stable funding ratios under Basel III) aim to limit extreme maturity mismatches. Sovereigns and firms that maintain longer average debt maturities and adequate liquid buffers are generally more resilient.

Shadow banking maturity mismatch refers to the practice by non-bank financial intermediaries of funding longer-term or less-liquid assets with short-term, often runnable liabilities—performing the classic banking function of maturity transformation (and related liquidity transformation) outside the traditional regulated banking system.

This creates inherent fragility: if short-term funders suddenly refuse to roll over financing, the entity cannot liquidate assets quickly without fire-sale losses, potentially triggering systemic stress.

What Is Shadow Banking?

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) defines shadow banking (now often called non-bank financial intermediation, or NBFI) as credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system that raise systemic risk concerns through maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage, and/or flawed credit risk transfer—or that enable regulatory arbitrage.

Key players and instruments historically and currently include:

Money market funds (MMFs)
Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs)
Repo markets and securities financing
Broker-dealers
Finance companies
Certain open-ended investment funds, hedge funds, and private credit vehicles
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs) used in securitization chains

These entities intermediate credit similarly to banks but typically lack deposit insurance, direct access to central bank lender-of-last-resort facilities, or the same prudential capital and liquidity rules.

How Maturity Mismatch Works in Shadow Banking

Traditional banks take short-term deposits to fund longer-term loans. Shadow banks do the same—or more extreme versions—via wholesale funding:

Short-term liabilities: Overnight or very short-term repos, ABCP (often maturing in days or weeks), MMF shares redeemable on demand, or other “shadow deposits.”
Longer-term or illiquid assets: Mortgage-backed securities (MBS), asset-backed securities (ABS), longer-maturity loans, or structured credit products.

The intermediation chain can be multi-step and opaque (e.g., loans → securitized into ABS → funded via ABCP conduits or repos → held by MMFs). This amplifies opacity and risk.

Unlike banks, shadow entities often rely on market confidence and collateral values. When confidence evaporates, funders withdraw, forcing asset sales that depress prices further (a classic fire-sale spiral).

Historical Example: The 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis

Maturity mismatch in the shadow banking system was a core amplifier of the crisis:

ABCP conduits and SIVs: These vehicles held longer-term structured credit (including subprime-related assets) funded primarily by short-term ABCP. Average ABCP maturities were often ~30 days or less while assets had multi-year durations. When concerns about underlying asset quality rose in summer 2007, investors refused to roll over ABCP. Conduits faced liquidity crises; many required sponsor (often bank) support or liquidated assets at losses. This froze key funding markets and transmitted stress to banks via backup lines of credit.
Repo markets and investment banks: Firms like Lehman Brothers funded long-duration, illiquid holdings (e.g., mortgage-related securities) with extremely short-term (often overnight) repo financing. A run on repo funding was a major factor in failures. One description noted the extreme mismatch of funding 30-year loans essentially rolled over every 24 hours.
Money market funds: These offered on-demand liquidity while investing in slightly longer or riskier short-term paper, creating run risk. The Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck” after Lehman’s failure, accelerating runs.

The shadow banking system contracted sharply (estimates of several trillion dollars), requiring extensive official liquidity support and guarantees to prevent a broader credit collapse.

Risks and Systemic Implications

Run vulnerability: Short-term wholesale funding is more fragile than insured deposits; loss of confidence can cause sudden, system-wide withdrawal.
Fire sales and contagion: Forced sales of assets depress prices, harming other holders and amplifying losses.
Interconnectedness with banks: Banks often provide liquidity backstops, credit lines, or act as counterparties, so shadow stress spills over (and vice versa).
Procyclicality: Leverage and mark-to-market practices can amplify booms and busts.
Opacity: Long intermediation chains obscure ultimate risks.

Not all NBFI involves heavy mismatch. Recent analyses of private credit funds, for example, find relatively high equity capitalization (often 65–80% of assets) and limited maturity transformation (fund lives of 8–12 years vs. loan maturities of 2–4 years), suggesting lower systemic fragility than traditional shadow banking models—though liquidity and leverage risks remain areas of monitoring.

Regulatory Responses and Current Landscape

Post-crisis reforms targeted these vulnerabilities:

Enhanced consolidation and capital/liquidity rules for banks’ exposures to shadow entities (Basel III).
MMF reforms to reduce run susceptibility (e.g., liquidity requirements, floating NAVs in some cases).
Securities financing transaction (SFT) rules, including haircut frameworks, to limit leverage and mismatch.
FSB monitoring of “narrow” shadow banking measures focused on activities with maturity/liquidity transformation or leverage.
Ongoing work on open-ended funds’ liquidity mismatches and NBFI leverage.

The FSB continues annual global monitoring. While some pre-crisis forms of shadow maturity transformation have declined, the broader NBFI sector has grown, and new forms (including private credit and certain investment funds) receive scrutiny for potential mismatches, especially under tighter monetary conditions.

In short, maturity mismatch is a fundamental source of fragility in shadow banking because it replicates the core risk of banking without the full suite of public backstops and prudential safeguards. Effective regulation aims to ensure that the economic costs of this transformation are properly internalized rather than socialized in crises.

Yesterday morning, August 24th, 2026, it was reported that Tsy Sec. Scott Bessent intends to utilize the $950B Treasury General Account to bolster Treasury buybacks of long-dated Treasury Bonds that are “somewhat illiquid” and “off-the-run” securities. Make no mistake. The Treasury is panicking before the midterm elections and trying to put a ceiling on mortgage rates by purchasing long-term bonds.

Mohammed El-Erian opined yesterday morning that Treasury is not bringing a big bazooka. To bring a big bazooka, Treasury would need Congressional action. He pointed out that the Treasury General Account was enhanced under Biden to $550 - $600 Billion (now $950 Bil.) and was meant to provide emergency funding in the event of a crisis. He speculated that no more than $100 Bil. would likely be utilized. Market impact was that the 30-year dropped by roughly 4.3 basis points.

The chickens are coming home to roost! And the Bond Vigilantes have likely NOT had their last say. As a result, I lean towards shorting long US Debt, adding to shorts in US equities, shorting the US dollar and shorting the stocks of corporate single family rental properties.

WCF

William C. Feeley, CAIA Summary Biography

Bill Feeley is an Equity Long/Short Manager who is the Founder and CEO of Barometer Trading, LLC, which has outperformed its Equity Long/Short Fund peers for over 61 months primarily by utilizing equities and index and single stock options. He tilts heavily towards value and avoids most large-cap technology names which he considers grossly overvalued. He periodically adjusts positioning to attempt to capture what he believes are major shifting macro considerations…ergo this note.

Mr. Feeley is 68 Years old and has almost 50 years of experience in the financial markets at senior levels. He has served as Head of Corpoate Finance, Head of Equities, Head of Capital Markets and Head of Syndicate for Investment Banks large and small. He has an MBA in Finance from Loyola University of Chicago and a BSBA in Finance and Economics from Georgetown University. He is a Charter holder as Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst (CAIA).

If you are an accredited investor and wish to review Barometer’s Performance, please visit www.barometertrading.com